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This study investigates empirically how residence in ethnic enclaves affects labour 
market  outcomes  of  refugees.  Self-selection  into  ethnic  enclaves  in  terms  of 
unobservable characteristics is taken into account by exploitation of a Danish spatial 
dispersal policy which randomly disperses new refugees across locations conditional 
on six individual-specific characteristics. 
The results show that refugees with unfavourable unobserved characteristics are 
found to self-select into ethnic enclaves. Furthermore, taking account of negative 
self-selection, a relative standard deviation increase in ethnic group size on average 
increases  the  employment  probability  of  refugees  by  4  percentage  points  and 
earnings by 21 percent. I argue that in case of heterogenous treatment effects, the 
estimated effects are local average treatment effects. 
 ETHNIC ENCLAVES AND IMMIGRANT LABOUR MARKET
OUTCOMES: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE1
Anna Piil Damm2
This study investigates empirically how residence in ethnic enclaves aﬀects labour market
outcomes of refugees. Self-selection into ethnic enclaves in terms of unobservable characteris-
tics is taken into account by exploitation of a Danish spatial dispersal policy which randomly
disperses new refugees across locations conditional on six individual-speciﬁc characteristics.
The results show that refugees with unfavourable unobserved characteristics are found to
self-select into ethnic enclaves. Furthermore, taking account of negative self-selection, a relative
standard deviation increase in ethnic group size on average increases the employment proba-
bility of refugees by 4 percentage points and earnings by 21 percent. I argue that in case of
heterogenous treatment eﬀects, the estimated eﬀects are local average treatment eﬀects.
I. Introduction
Immigrants in advanced societies tend to live spatially concentrated in the larger cities,
see for instance Bartel (1989) or Borjas (1998) for US evidence.
Residential segregation of immigrants is commonly believed to hamper integration of
immigrants into the society. This is a key reason for which many West-European countries
spatially disperse refugees and asylum seekers. Migration researchers agree that integra-
tion of immigrants into the labour market is of major importance for overall integration
o fi m m i g r a n t si n t ot h es o c i e t y .I ti st h e r e f o r ei m p o r t a n tt ok n o wh o wr e s i d e n c ei ne t h n i c
enclaves aﬀects labour market outcomes of immigrants. At least ﬁve theories exist on how
living in an ethnic enclave may aﬀect labour market outcomes of immigrants. According
to one hypothesis, residence in an ethnic enclave promotes economic assimilation of recent
immigrants because ethnic enclaves create closer ethnic networks that are likely to give
members of the networks access to additional information in the host country. Four other
hypotheses all predict that living in an ethnic enclave hampers economic assimilation of
1I am grateful to Jacob Arendt for his AGLS estimation expertise. I thank conference participants at
ESPE 2004, ESEM 2004 and CReAM-TARGET Immigration Conference 2006, workshop participants at
the CIM workshop spring 2004, CAM seminar autumn 2004, Aarhus University seminar winter 2005 and
Aarhus School of Business seminar winter 2005. I am especially indebted to discussions with Helena Skyt-
Nielsen, Christian Dustmann, Stephen Lich-Tyler and Yoram Weiss. Finally, I am grateful to Michael
Rosholm and Peter Fredriksson for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The project was
ﬁnanced by grant 24-03-0288 from the Danish Research Agency.
2Assistant Research Professor, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silke-
borgvej 2, 8000 Århus C, Denmark. Email: apd@asb.dk.
1recent immigrants, by decreasing the rate of acquisition of host-country-speciﬁch u m a n
capital due to reduced social interaction with natives, by decreasing reservation wages of
recent immigrants, by decreasing the quality of local public institutions such as job of-
ﬁces and by increasing natives’ prejudice against ethnic minorities and thereby increasing
labour market discrimination of ethnic minorities.
Hence, theoretically the eﬀect of residence in an ethnic enclave on labour market
outcomes of immigrants is ambiguous in sign. As a consequence, determination of the
sign, as well as the size, of the causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size is an empirical matter.
Empirical evidence of the causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on economic success of
immigrants is scarce. This is probably due to diﬃculties of identifying the eﬀect of ethnic
enclave size. The diﬃculties arise because individuals sort into cities and neighbourhoods
based on unobserved personal attributes that also aﬀect their labour market outcomes.
The aim of this study is to estimate the causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on the
employment probability of recent immigrants, because Scandinavian welfare states face
an important challenge of how to increase the employment rate of immigrants. Due to
a high degree of central wage bargaining and high minimum wages relative to countries
outside Scandinavia, wage assimilation of immigrants, once employed, constitutes less of
a challenge (see e.g. Husted et al. 2001; Rosholm et al. 2000). In addition, the study
reports estimates of the causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on labour market earnings of
immigrants.
The study proposes a novel way of exploiting a spatial dispersal policy on refugees
and asylum seekers in order to estimate the causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on socio-
economic outcomes of immigrants. Ethnic enclave size is measured by the number of co-
nationals in the municipality of residence. The identiﬁcation strategy is to exploit a former
Danish spatial dispersal policy under which 90% of all refugees and asylum seekers were
randomly assigned to locations at the time of asylum, conditional on six characteristics of
the individual. Ethnic enclave size some years after immigration is instrumented by the
number of co-nationals placed under the terms of the Danish spatial dispersal policy in an
individual’s municipality of assignment in the year of immigration and prior to the year of
immigration, i.e. by the initial and past inﬂows of placed co-nationals. Conditional on the
six characteristics of the individual which may have inﬂuenced the location of assignment,
the initial and past inﬂow of placed co-nationals is a valid instrument for future ethnic
enclave size. Furthermore, the instrument makes it possible to take account of location
sorting both within and across larger geographical areas. In addition, it allows for over-
identiﬁcation tests for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Finally, the validity
of our instrument is robust to diﬀerential sorting of ethnic groups into locations, i.e. that
ethnic groups react to potential group-speciﬁc labour market returns to residence in a
given local labour market.
2The causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on socio-economic outcomes of immigrants is
estimated using data on refugees and asylum seekers extracted from longitudinal admin-
istrative registers of Statistics Denmark for the total immigrant population in Denmark
1984-2000. The registers provide information on country of origin, labour market at-
tachment, earnings as well as geographic and individual information. Using a variety of
speciﬁcations and samples, we consistently ﬁnd strong evidence of location sorting, specif-
ically negative self-selection of refugees and asylum seekers into ethnic enclaves. Taking
account of location sorting, the average causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size is positive and
signiﬁcant. The larger the ethnic enclave, the larger the employment probability and
labour market earnings of refugees. The estimated eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant in
size. According to the preferred model, a relative standard deviation increase in ethnic
enclave size on average increases the employment probability of refugees by on average
4 percentage points and earnings by 21 percent. The results indicate that the positive
eﬀe c t so fe t h n i cn e t w o r k sd o m i n a t et h ep o t e n t i a ln e g a t i v ee ﬀects of living in an ethnic
enclave. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that living in an ethnic enclave
facilitates access to ethnic networks that promote economic assimilation of recent immi-
grants by giving members of the networks access to additional information in the host
country.
The ﬁnal point of the paper is to demonstrate that the instrumental variables estimate
of ethnic enclave size identiﬁes an interesting policy parameter even if one relaxes the
assumption of homogeneous treatment eﬀects. In case of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
where individuals with the same observable characteristics select into the program on the
basis of the idiosynchratic component of their response to the program, the instrumental
variables estimate identiﬁes the average eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on the labour market
outcome gain of the subgroup of refugees subject to the spatial dispersal policy who are
induced to decrease their future ethnic enclave size because opting out of the dispersal
programme after initial assignment to a municipality is costly due to migration costs.
II. Theory
Several competing hypotheses exist on how residence in an ethnic enclave aﬀects labour
adjustment of adult immigrants.
Many researchers believe that ethnic enclaves create closer social networks between
people of a common ethnicity living in geographical proximity of each other, henceforth
referred to as ethnic networks. As noted by Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000),
social networks aﬀect individual behaviour through two potentially important channels:
information and norms. The information channel stresses how a person’s knowledge de-
pends on the behaviour of other members of the social network, for instance due to herd
behaviour/informational cascades which occur when it is optimal for an individual to
3follow the behaviour of the preceding individual without regard to his own information
(Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992) or due to contacts to individ-
uals in certain circumstances being crucial for attainment of some outcome. The norms
channel emphasizes that an individual’s behaviour may be a social custom, deﬁned as an
act whose utility to the individual performing it depends on the beliefs or actions of other
members of the social network (Akerlof 1980).3
In this paper, focus is on the importance of ethnic networks for employment and
earnings of recent immigrants. Several researchers, notably sociologists, argue that ethnic
networks are likely to promote economic assimilation of recent immigrants by giving mem-
bers of the networks access to additional information in the host country. The information
channel is likely to operate through contacts with valuable knowledge of various kinds.
Contacts may have knowledge about job vacancies, for instance in ethnic businesses or
ethnic niches, or valuable information for establishment of own business such as knowledge
about business and loan opportunities and knowledge about disciplined co-ethnic workers
searching for a job.4 Alternatively, contacts may disseminate information about income
alternatives to employment, such as welfare eligibility. Studies of Chinatown in New York,
Little Havana in Miami and Coreatown in Los Angeles provide empirical evidence that
ethnic networks constitute a crucial resource for ethnic businesses (Portes 1998, 13).
Social norms may inﬂuence employment status directly (e.g. work ethics, self-employment
traditions or attitudes towards receipt of social beneﬁts or traditional versus modern divi-
sion of labour between spouses) and indirectly (e.g. norms regarding early marriage which
may aﬀect the fertility rate as well as the level of educational attainment of women) (see
e.g. Coleman et al. 1966; Wilson 1987; Case and Katz 1991; Borjas 1995; Glaeser, Sac-
erdote and Scheinkman 1996; Bertrand et al. 2000). Such peer eﬀects may promote or
hinder economic success of ethnic minorities depending on the nature of the social norms
which are prevalent in the ethnic community.
Some economists speculate that residence in an ethnic enclave slows down the rate
of acquisition of host-country-speciﬁc human capital, such as host country language
(Chiswick 1991; Lazear 1999). The reason is that residence in an ethnic enclave may de-
crease the extent to which ethnic minority members interact socially with natives, thereby
decreasing the incentives for ethnic minorities to invest in the acquisition of the host-
3Such social customs may be of pecuniary disadvantage to the individual. As illustrated theoretically
by Akerlof (1980), they may nevertheless persist as a result of the social sanction imposed by loss of
reputation from breaking the custom.
4Ethnic niches emerge when an ethnic group is able to colonise a particular sector of the labour market
in which members of the network are given priority to vacant positions. In the American literature
examples range from jobs in restaurants and textile factories to police and ﬁre departments and certain
departments of the public administration in New York and Miami.
4country language and increasing the costs of acquiring such language skills. Chiswick and
Miller argue further that lack of host-country language proﬁciency reduces an individual’s
education opportunities and job mobility between geographical locations, occupations and
employers, thereby limiting the earnings opportunities of the individual (Chiswick 1991;
Chiswick and Miller 1995).
Furthermore, Chiswick and Miller speculate that living in an ethnic enclave has a
negative eﬀect on earnings of ethnic minorities for another reason. They argue that
ethnic minorities will be willing to accept a job at a lower wage if the job is located in
an ethnic enclave, because residence in an ethnic enclave reduces the cost of consumption
of ethnic goods and services such as traditional food products from the source country,
clubs for co-nationals and places for practising religion (Chiswick and Miller 1995).5
In addition, an increase in the share of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood may
decrease the quality of local public institutions such as job centers unless budgets of local
public institutions are increased to cover the increased work load arising from language
and cultural barriers between public employees and users. Deterioration of the quality
of local public institutions may turn into a self-reinforcing process if the best employees
decide to change workplace to a workplace with more resources.
Finally, according to the spatial mismatch hypothesis by Kain (1968), residential seg-
regation of Blacks in US cities has reduced job opportunities of Blacks. Kain’s spatial
mismatch hypothesis for Blacks in U.S. cities may apply more generally as a description of
how residential segregation of ethnic minorities hurts economic success of ethnic minori-
ties. On the supply side, there may be a mismatch between the location of ethnic enclaves
and workplaces. Working outside an ethnic enclave may involve so high commuting costs
and time so as to deter ethnic enclave members from searching for a job where vacant jobs
are located. In addition, ethnic enclave members may receive less information about job
vacancies distant from the ethnic enclave. On the demand side, prejudices against other
ethnic groups may be reinforced by separate living of ethnic groups. As a consequence,
native employers may discriminate against ethnic minorities due to actual or imaginary
fear for retaliation from native customers for bringing ethnic minorities into neighbour-
hoods for natives only. Similarly, employers in ethnic enclaves may prefer job applicants
from their own ethnic group.
The short description of the ﬁve hypotheses mentioned above demonstrates that the-
5One may object to this hypothesis by noting that in standard search models a relatively low reser-
vation wage implies a relatively high job oﬀer acceptance probability. In that case the short-run eﬀect
of living in an ethnic enclave on individual annual earnings is ambiguous, because annual earnings are
the product of hours of work throughout the year - which may increase - and hourly wages - which
may decrease. Furthermore, the medium-run eﬀect of living in an ethnic enclave may be unambiguously
positive because hourly wages are increasing in work experience.
5oretically the eﬀect of residence in an ethnic enclave on labour market outcomes of immi-
grants is ambiguous in sign. Therefore, the eﬀect of living in an ethnic enclave on labour




Suppose the true data generating model for employment status is given by
yi = I(y
∗
i > 0) (1)
y
∗
i = γei + X1iβ1 + εi (2)
where yi is an observable indicator variable equal to 1 if individual i is employed and 0
otherwise, y∗
i is an unobserved latent random variable which is a function of an observed
scalar variable ei which is a measure for ethnic enclave size of individual i, a vector of
observed and unobserved personal, ethnic group and (other) local area characteristics,
X1i,a n da ne r r o rt e r mεi. γ is the key parameter of interest. It is meant to capture the
average eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on the employment probability.
Estimation of this model poses omitted variables problems, because individuals choose
where to live, i.e. the ethnic enclave size. For example, individuals who live in a relatively
l a r g ee t h n i ce n c l a v em a yd i ﬀer in some unobserved ways from individuals who live in a
relatively small ethnic enclave.
Previous literature has used diﬀerent empirical strategies to identify the eﬀect of resi-
dential segregation of ethnic minorities on socio-economic outcomes of ethnic minorities.
Two previous studies, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) and Bertrand, Luttmer and Mul-
lainathan (2000), avoid the issue of within-city sorting by ability by exploiting the vari-
ation across a larger geographical area. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) examine the eﬀects
of residential segregation on outcomes for blacks in US cities in schooling, employment
and single parenthood by examining whether outcomes for blacks as a whole are bet-
ter or worse in cities that are less racially segregated. They address the issue of reverse
causality where poor outcomes lead to increased segregation by instrumenting segregation
across cities by the structure of local government ﬁnance and topographical features of
the city that aﬀect segregation. They address the issue of cross-metropolitan mobility by
examining the eﬀect of location early in life on adult outcomes.
Bertrand et al. (2000) investigate how access to ethnic networks aﬀects social wel-
fare dependency of ethnic minorities. They suggest to avoid omitted variables bias from
6omitted neighbourhood characteristics (e.g. diﬀerences in job availability and adminis-
trative welfare eligibility practices) and ethnic group characteristics (e.g. discrimination)
by inclusion of neighbourhood and ethnic group ﬁxed eﬀects. The remaining potential
omitted bias stems from omitted personal characteristics. It arises if the individuals dif-
ferentially self-select away from their ethnic group in the host country. Bertrand et al.
(2000) take such omitted variables bias into account by exploiting the variation across a
larger geographical area.
However, as pointed out by Edin, Fredriksson et Åslund (2003), instruments that
exploit the variation across a larger geographical area only take selection within the larger
geographical areas into account, while they ignore the potential selection across larger
geographical areas. Furthermore, inclusion of neighbourhood ﬁxed eﬀects for the current
neighbourhood does not take all sorting across locations into account, because the choice
of the current neighbourhood is an endogenous outcome which is likely to be correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the individual.
The ideal data for empirical determination of the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on socio-
economic outcomes of ethnic minorities would be a randomized experiment in which
ethnic minorities were randomly distributed across locations and persuaded to stay in
the location of assignment for a considerable period of time. Such data rarely exist.
However, quasi-experimental evidence may exist for countries which have implemented
spatial dispersal policies on refugees and asylum seekers aiming at settlement of refugees
and asylum seekers outside the immigrant-dense cities.
Edin et al. (2003) argue that almost all refugees and asylum seekers were randomly
assigned to locations at the time of asylum under a former Swedish spatial dispersal
policy on refugees and asylum seekers and exploit the resulting quasi-experimental data
to examine the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on earnings of immigrants. Their measure for
ethnic enclave size is the number of co-nationals living in individual i’s municipality of
residence. Ethnic enclave size eight years after asylum is instrumented by the initial ethnic
enclave size, i.e. the stock of co-nationals in an individual’s municipality of assignment at
t h et i m eo fa s y l u m .T h ei n s t r u m e n th a st w os t r e n g t h s .F i r s t ,i tt a k e sa c c o u n to fl o c a t i o n
sorting both within and across larger geographical areas. Second, omitted neighbourhood
characteristics are captured by inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects of the municipality of assignment
rather than of the current municipality of residence.
I will argue that a former Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees and asylum
seekers also provide quasi-experimental evidence on the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on
labour market outcomes of immigrants. I will estimate the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size
on labour market outcomes of immigrants along the lines of Edin et al (2003). However,
I will argue that better candidates for exclusion restrictions exist than the initial ethnic
enclave size.
7Following Edin et al. (2003) I will measure the ethnic enclave size, ei, by the ethnic
group size of individual i which is deﬁned as the number of co-nationals living in individ-
ual i’s municipality of residence. Hence, implicitly ethnicity is measured by country of
origin following Borjas (1992, 1995, 1998). Co-nationals are ﬁrst and second generation
immigrants from individual i’s country of origin. The implicit deﬁnition of an ethnic
enclave underlying the empirical analysis is that individual i lives in an ethnic enclave if
he lives in a municipality in which the number of co-nationals exceeds a given threshold.
I will estimate the model given by Equations (1) and (2) using a panel of administrative
register data for refugees and asylum seekers who were subject to the former Danish spatial
dispersal policy. Speciﬁcally, I will estimate the model seven years after asylum, at which
time individuals are recent immigrants but have had time for establishment of social
networks in the host-country and acquisition of basic skills necessary for job search in the
host country. X1 will include a vector of observed personal characteristics at the time of
immigration which may aﬀect labour market outcomes of the individual. In addition, X1
contains three types of ﬁxed eﬀects to capture omitted variables bias in
ˆ
γ stemming from
calendar time eﬀects, omitted ethnic group characteristics, i.e. the ”quality” of the ethnic
enclave, and omitted local area characteristics: 1) year of immigration ﬁxed eﬀects, 2)
ethnic group ﬁxed eﬀects and 3) ﬁxed eﬀects for the municipality to which an individual
was assigned by the authorities at the time of asylum.
The model may still suﬀer from omitted variables bias to the extent that individuals
with certain unobserved characteristics, e.g. poor abilities or lack of ambitions about
socio-economic assimilation in the host country, are overrepresented in locations with a
relatively large ethnic group size. I propose to take account of self-selection into ethnic
enclaves by exploiting a former spatial dispersal policy on refugees and asylum seekers in
Denmark to ﬁnd a valid and strong instrument of the potentially endogenous explanatory
variable, the ethnic group size of individual i seven years after immigration. I now turn
to a description of the aims and the actual implementation of that policy.
I I I . B .T h eN a t u r a lE x p e r i m e n t
1986 marks the start of the ﬁrst Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees and asylum
seekers who had just received a permit to stay for reasons of asylum.6 Henceforth, I refer
to such recognised refugees and asylum seekers as refugees. The Danish Government urged
the Danish Refugee Council to implement the dispersal policy after a surge of refugees
in the mid-eighties made it increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to satisfy the location
6Until June 2002, Denmark gave asylum to Convention refugees, i.e. persons who were deﬁned as
refugees according to the Geneva Convention of 1951, and to foreigners who were not deﬁned as refugees
according to the Geneva Convention, but who for similar reasons as stated in the Convention or other
weighty reasons should not be required to return to the home country (’de facto’ refugees). [Coleman
and Wadensjö 1999, 249].
8preferences of most new refugees for accommodation in the larger cities. The policy was
in force until 1999 under the charge of the Council.
Spatial dispersal was a two-stage process. At the country level, the Council aimed
at the attainment of an equal number of refugees relative to the number of inhabitants
across counties. At the county level, the Council aimed at attaining an equal number
of refugees relative to the number of inhabitants across municipalities (local authority
districts) with suitable facilities for reception such as housing, educational institutions,
employment opportunities and co-nationals.7 In practice, these dispersal criteria implied
that refugees were provided with permanent housing in cities and towns and to a lesser
extent in the rural districts (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1996). In 1987, 243 out of a total
of 275 municipalities in Denmark had received refugees (Danish Refugee Council 1987).
In practice, the settlement took place in three steps. First, as soon as a refugee was
granted asylum, the individual was oﬀered assistance from the Council in ﬁnding housing.
If the individual accepted the oﬀer, he/she ﬁlled in a form concerning his/her background
such as nationality.8 Second, approximately 10 days later the Council assigned a refugee to
one of 15 counties. Third, having been provided with temporary housing in the receiving
county, local oﬃces of the Council assisted the assigned refugees in ﬁnding permanent
housing in the county. The local oﬃces were mobile within a county. They typically
stayed in a local area for about 3 years focusing on ﬁnding permanent housing for assigned
refugees in that particular area of the county in order to facilitate establishment of ethnic
networks and give refugees easy access to services provided and activities oﬀered by the
local oﬃce.
Dispersal was voluntary in the sense that only refugees who were unable to ﬁnd hous-
ing themselves were subject to the dispersal policy. However, the take-up rate was high;
between 1986 and 1997 approximately 90% of refugees were provided with permanent
housing by the Council (or after 1995 by a local government) under the terms of the dis-
persal policy (Annual Reports of the Danish Refugee Council 1986-1994 and the Council’s
internal administrative statistics for 1995-1998).
Once settled, refugees participated in Danish language courses during an introductory
period of 18 months while receiving social assistance. Refugees were urged to stay in
the assigned municipality during the entire introductory period. However, there were no
relocation restrictions. Refugees could move away from the municipality of assignment at
7In order to facilitate local refugee reception, the Council made an eﬀort only to place one or two
diﬀerent nationalities in small municipalities whereas larger municipalities would be assigned more na-
tionality groups of refugees. Refugees were expected to beneﬁt from this practice as well, since it enabled
them to live near co-nationals irrespective of the size of the municipality of assignment.
8In the ﬁrst years after the introduction of the dispersal policy the form also contained questions about
any location wishes and their reasons.
9any time, in so far as they could ﬁnd alternative housing elsewhere. Receipt of welfare
was unconditional on residing in the assigned municipality.
The dispersal policy did, at least in the short run, inﬂuence the location pattern
of refugees. In 1993, the settlement pattern of refugees resembled that of the Danish
population and diﬀered greatly from that of non-western immigrants. 33% of refugees
and 26% of the Danish population lived in the capital or its suburbs while as much as
71% of non-western immigrants lived there. 56% of refugees and 59% of the Danish
population lived in towns outside the capital as opposed to only 24% of non-western
immigrants. The remaining shares lived in rural districts (Danish Refugee Council 1993).
The important question of whether refugees were randomly distributed across locations
under the spatial dispersal policy is analysed in a related study, Damm (2005). The study
examines the initial settlement pattern of refugees who got asylum between 1986 and 1998
based on a range of data sources: an interview with two placement oﬃcers at the Council,
the Council’s internal administrative statistics and administrative registers. The study
concludes that the Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees carried out between 1986
and 1998 gave rise to a random initial distribution of refugees who were provided with or
assisted in ﬁnding permanent housing by the Council, conditional on six characteristics of
the individual: health (in need of special medical or psychiatric treatment), educational
needs, location of close relatives, family size (single or not), nationality as well as year
of immigration. Refugees in need of special treatment or special education, refugees who
insisted on living near close relatives in Denmark, married refugees with children and
refugees who immigrated early in the dispersal policy period may have been more likely
to realise their preferred settlement option than other refugee groups. The main reasons
are given below.
First, an interview with two former placement oﬃcers at the Council reveals that
the Council aimed at satisfying location wishes of refugees who wished to be assigned
to a location near close family members and at assigning refugees who were in need of
special medical or psychological treatment or education to a location in which the required
treatment or educational facilities were present.
Secondly, the Council’s internal administrative statistics on the length of stay in tem-
porary housing in the years 1988-1996 suggest that it was typically a somewhat more
diﬃcult task to ﬁnd permanent housing for singles than for refugee families. On average
a refugee lived in temporary housing 6-7 months after assignment to a county, but the
duration depended on the local housing market situation. In almost every year a larger
share of singles than refugees with family waited more than 9 months for permanent hous-
ing. Only 0-4 % had not found permanent housing within the introductory period of 18
months (Administrative statistics of the Danish Refugee Council for the years 1992-1997
and annual reports of the Danish Refugee Council for the years 1986-1994). Concerning
10the location of the permanent dwelling, for practical reasons it was typically located near
the temporary dwelling, not necessarily in the same municipality but at the least in a
nearby municipality.
Thirdly, over time it became increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to ﬁnd vacant rental
housing units in the larger and medium-sized towns which suggests that refugees who
arrived in the ﬁrst years after the introduction of the dispersal policy may have been
more likely to realise their potential location wish. Note however, that the location wish
of refugees to live in a larger city soon became less pronounced after the implementation
of the dispersal policy. The Council’s Annual Report 1986 contains a paragraph on this
issue. The translation of the paragraph reads: "The former wish among refugees to be
assigned to certain larger cities no longer poses signiﬁcant problems. In general refugees
have been welcomed by the local community and experienced the conditions in a small
community to be at least as good and of the same kind as oﬀers available in the larger
cities" (Danish Refugee Council 1986).
Finally, refugees from certain source countries seem to have been less likely to be
assigned to a larger city. Empirical evidence from administrative registers presented in
Damm (2005) show that this is the case for refugees from Sri Lanka, Palestinian refugees
from Lebanon and in particular for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who were dispersed
under a special introduction programme that included settlement in rural districts.
Note, however, that the way in which the dispersal policy was implemented implied lit-
tle opportunity for municipalities to cream-skim refugees, i.e. to express a wish for receiv-
ing, for instance, well-educated refugees. First, the Council placed refugees in temporary
housing shortly after a refugee had received his/her residence permit and the Council did
not know which groups of refugees would next receive residence permits. This procedure
left little time for negotiation between the Council and municipalities. Furthermore, the
Council acted as a private agent searching for housing in the local housing market on be-
half of refugees who had just received a residence permit. The local authorities typically
weren’t informed about the relocation of a refugee to the municipality until after a refugee
had been provided with housing in the municipality. There is some empirical evidence
to back this claim. Linear regression of the number of inhabitants in the municipality of
assignment on a range of characteristics of the individual shows absence of a correlation
between the size of the municipality of assignment and an individual’s educational level.9
Three of the six characteristics which may have inﬂuenced the location of assignment of
a refugee are observable in longitudinal administrative registers of Statistics Denmark on
the total immigrant population in Denmark 1984-2000: family status (marital status and
number of children), nationality and year of immigration. In addition, the registers contain
9The estimation results are available from the author upon request.
11variables which may be good proxies for two of the three unobservable characteristics: age
and nationality may be decent proxies for an individual’s educational need and nationality
and the size of the ethnic stock, deﬁned as the total number of co-nationals in Denmark, at
the time of immigration may be decent proxies for the likelihood of having close relatives in
Denmark at the time of immigration. In conclusion, one potentially important individual
characteristic for initial settlement is unobserved in the Immigrant Data Set: health status
at the time of immigration.
III.C. Instrumenting ethnic group size
The model in which the ethnic group size seven years after immigration is instrumented
corresponds to rewriting the model given by Equations (1) and (2) as a simultaneous
equation system with a structural equation for the endogenous variable of interest, y∗
i,
and a reduced-form equation for the endogenous explanatory variable, ei.F o r m a l l y ,t h e
system is written as follows:
yi = I(y
∗
i > 0) (3)
y
∗
i = γei + X1iβ1 + εi (4)
ei = XiΠ + υi (5)
i =1 ,...,n
where Xi includes X1i and the instrument, Zi. Conditional on X1i, the error terms of
Equations (4) and (5) are assumed to be multivariate normal,
(εi,υi)=N(0,Σ) (6)
This model is a binary choice model with one endogenous continuous explanatory
variable which is a special case of the cross-sectional limited dependent models with en-
dogenous explanatory variables discussed in Heckman (1978), Amemiya (1978), Smith
and Blundell (1986), Blundell and Smith (1989) who propose diﬀerent consistent estima-
tors. Three types of consistent instrumental variables estimators are suggested: Heckman
Two-Step (Heckman 1978) and the closely related instrumental variables Probit estimator
(Lee 1981), Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) (Amemiya 1978, Newey 1987)
and Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (Smith and Blundell 1986, Rivers and
Vuong 1988). An alternative consistent - and eﬃcient - estimator for such a model is joint
Maximum Likelihood discussed in Amemiya (1978).
I will use Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2SCML) to test for weak
exogeneity of ethnic group size seven years after immigration, ei, a n dA G L St oe s t i m a t e
the model given by the Equations (3)-(6).
12Turning to the important issue of the existence of identifying variables, I argue that
the number of adult co-nationals placed in the municipality of assignment in the year
of asylum and prior to the year of asylum constitute valid exclusion restrictions in esti-
mation of the eﬀect of ethnic group size on the employment probability seven years after
immigration, controlling for all characteristics of the individual which may have inﬂuenced
initial assignment to a municipality of residence. Unfortunately I am unable to include
one characteristic of the individual which may have aﬀected the initial assignment as well
as labour market outcomes of the individual in X1: the individual’s health status at the
time of asylum. Individuals in need of special psychological/psychiatric treatment at the
time of immigration may have been more likely to be settled in a large city and therefore
more exposed to other immigrants initially than others, ceteris paribus. Such individ-
uals are also less likely to be employed initially. However, for at least two reasons this
unobserved characteristic may not be of concern in the analysis. First, individuals who
received psychological treatment at the time of settlement are likely to constitute a minor
fraction of the sample.10 Second, the correlation between number of inhabitants in the
municipality of assignment and the number of co-nationals in the municipality of assign-
ment is moderate. There are two reasons for that. Under the dispersal policy co-nationals
tended to be dispersed across locations in ethnic clusters, and for almost all ethnic groups
in the sample, the number of co-nationals who had arrived prior to the introduction of
the dispersal policy and settled in the larger cities was small.
The instrument will contain the subset of the candidates for identifying variables that
gives the best linear predictor among the instruments for which the test of over-identifying
variables cannot be rejected. This instrument will be a good predictor for ethnic enclave
size seven years after asylum to the extent that a considerable share of refugees have
remained settled in the municipality of assignment.
Furthermore, the instrument has two strengths relative to the instrument used by
Edin et al. (2003), initial ethnic group size. First, the validity of the instrument can be
tested by performing an over-identiﬁcation test, because the instrument contains more
than one identifying variable. Any identifying strategy that relies on an assumption
of orthogonality between the instrument and the error terms should aim at testing the
validity of over-identifying restrictions. Second, the validity of the instrument is robust
to diﬀerential sorting of ethnic groups into locations, i.e. that ethnic groups relocate into
diﬀerent locations after initial assignment based on potential group-speciﬁc labour market
returns to residence in a given local labour market. In case of diﬀerential sorting of ethnic
10In an interview with the Danish national newspaper, Politiken, social worker Bente Midtgård, Reha-
bilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims, Denmark, said that new refugees are not examined
for complications due to torture. Therefore, no oﬃcial numbers exist on the number of new refugees who
have been subject to torture. (Politiken, 1st Section, p. 4, 5th of December 2003).
13groups into locations, the initial ethnic group size of individual i may be the result of the
relocation pattern of past cohorts of initially placed co-nationals rather than a result of
random assignment of refugees under the dispersal policy.11
III.D. Data
Micro data on refugees is extracted from longitudinal administrative registers of Sta-
tistics Denmark on the immigrant population in Denmark 1984-2000. The refugee sample
is a balanced panel of 13,927 individuals who are observed annually in the registers from
the time of receipt of a permit to stay, also referred to as the time of immigration, until
seven years after immigration.12
Ideally the sample should cover observations on all adult refugees who were assigned
to a municipality by the Council under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy in place
from 1986 to 1998. However, information on admission category of immigrants and the
assignment municipality of refugees is missing in the registers. I take account of the ﬁrst
issue by applying an algorithm based on country of origin and the ﬁrst year of residence
permit to Denmark to extract individuals from 11 main refugee-sending countries. The
algorithm was constructed from oﬃcial ﬁgures on the annual number of residence permits
granted to asylum-seekers by country of origin. Solving the second data issue is further
complicated by the fact that refugees may initially have lived in temporary housing in
proximity of the municipality to which they were later assigned, on average after 1 year.
I identify the municipality of assignment by using a rather complicated algorithm which
I constructed based on information on the Council’s internal administrative statistics on
temporary housing. I deﬁne the ﬁrst municipality of residence observed in the registers
as a municipality of temporary housing if the person relocates to another municipality
within the county within one year after receipt of the ﬁrst permit of residence. Otherwise
the ﬁrst municipality is deﬁned as the municipality of assignment.
Furthermore, we want to exclude family-reuniﬁed immigrants from refugee-sending
countries, because they were not subject to spatial dispersal, unless they immigrated
shortly after their spouse. I, therefore, exclude immigrants from refugee-sending countries,
who at the time of immigration were married to either 1) a Dane, 2) an immigrant from
11In case of diﬀerential sorting of ethnic groups into locations, the initial ethnic group size would only
be a valid instrument for future ethnic group size if interaction terms between municipality of assignment
ﬁxed eﬀects and ethnic group ﬁxed eﬀects were included as controls in Equation (2). In the present
study that would amount to large reduction of the number of degrees of freedom, in particular by 272
(municipality of assignment indicator variables) times eleven (ethnic group indicator variables) degrees
of freedom.
12Permanent return-migrants who emigrated prior to seven years of residence in Denmark and 18
individuals who were observed in the registers seven years after immigration but not annually up to that
point are excluded from the sample.
14Table I
Summary statistics for the dependent variables by ethnic group.
No. of individuals Employment rate Mean real annual earnings
Ethnic group: Men Women Men Women
Poland 393 .52 (.50) .42 (.49) 76,945 (49,689) 61,798 (42,985)
Iraq 2,213 .32 (.47) .13 (.33) 54,308 (49,890) 50,685 (49,582)
Iran 2,829 .34 (.47) .19 (.39) 42,663 (37,633) 37,168 (33,315)
Vietnam 1,331 .48 (.50) .24 (.43) 64,571 (39,421) 48,410 (31,288)
Sri Lanka 1,770 .54 (.50) .34 (.47) 58,716 (39,770) 41,381 (28,571)
Lebanon 3,867 .24 (.43) .06 (.24) 40,872 (41,075) 47,940 (41,119)
Ethiopia 146 .25 (.44) .26 (.44) 50,673 (41,275) 41,696 (21,366)
Afghanistan 268 .37 (.48) .16 (.37) 47,594 (43,023) 50,977 (39,075)
Somalia 872 .29 (.46) .09 (.29) 52,591 (42,401) 42,506 (38,891)
Rumania 216 .56 (.50) .5 (.50) 76,283 (52,911) 57,547 (35,849)
Chile 22 .36 (.50) .5 (.53) 64,003 (45,290) 50,448 (19,319)
All 13,927 .35 (.48) .18 (.38) 52,154 (43,026) 46,026 (37,138)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Real annual earnings are reported in
the Danish currency, Danish Kroner, for the subsample of refugees with positive earnings seven
years after immigration. Refugees from Lebanon are Palestinian refugees with no citizenship.
a non-refugee-sending country or 3) an immigrant from a refugee-sending country who
had immigrated at least one year earlier. Unfortunately the registers do not allow us to
exclude the 10% of refugees who turned down the Council’s oﬀer of housing under the
terms of the spatial dispersal policy. Finally, I include only individuals aged 18-59.
The refugee sample has rich information on demographic and socio-economic charac-
teristics of each individual, most importantly labour market status in November of each
year and annual labour market earnings. An individual is regarded as being employed,
if his main occupation is wage-employment with at least 9 hours of weekly work or self-
employment. The employment measure therefore includes part-time work of at least 9
hours of weekly work as well as full-time work. Real annual labour market earnings,
henceforth referred to as real annual earnings, are deﬁned as the sum of wage earnings,
proﬁts from own company and sickness beneﬁts deﬂated by the consumer price index
which has 1980 as its base year.
Further variable deﬁn i t i o n sa r er e p o r t e di nT a b l eA . Ii nt h eA p p e n d i x .
III.E. Summary Statistics
Seven years after immigration, the employment rate of the overall sample of refugees
is 0.29. However, the reported summary statistics in Table I show that the employment
rate varies substantially between ethnic groups and gender. For men, the employment
15Table II
Summary statistics for selected variables seven years after immigration by ethnic group.
Highest degree of education attained. Fractions. Ethnic group size
Ethnic group: No degree High school Professional Unknown
Poland .04 (.19) .10 (.30) .28 (.45) .58 (.49) 731 (957)
Iraq .05 (.22) .24 (.43) .27 (.45) .43 (.50) 1,407 (1,496)
Iran .05 (.21) .23 (.42) .18 (.38) .54 (.50) 1,063 (999)
Vietnam .10 (.30) .22 (.41) .06 (.24) .62 (.48) 770 (687)
Sri Lanka .05 (.22) .37 (.48) .09 (.28) .49 (.50) 161 (154)
Lebanon .10 (.30) .28 (.45) .09 (.29) .53 (.50) 1,280 (1,307)
Ethiopia .08 (.26) .15 (.36) .10 (.30) .67 (.47) 180 (136)
Afghanistan .03 (.16) .28 (.45) .26 (.44) .44 (.50) 223 (205)
Somalia .08 (.28) .24 (.43) .16 (.37) .52 (.50) 1,482 (1,165)
Rumania .01 (.10) .12 (.33) .28 (.45) .59 (.49) 83 (82)
Chile .05 (.21) .32 (.48) .09 (.29) .55 (.51) 156 (146)
All .07 (.25) .26 (.44) .15 (.36) .52 (.50) 1,010 (1,177)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Refugees from Lebanon are Pales-
tinian refugees with no citizenship.
rate seven years after immigration varies between 0.24 for Palestinian refugees from
Lebanon and 0.56 for Rumanians. For women, the employment rate seven years after
immigration varies between 0.06 for Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and 0.5 for Ru-
manian and Chilean refugees. For comparison, the employment rate of the overall Danish
population aged 18-59 ﬂuctuated between 0.78-0.84 for men and 0.66-0.69 for women in
the period 1986-1998.
Turning to real annual earnings, 5,647 individuals have positive real annual earnings
seven years after immigration. Conditional on having positive earnings, they earn on
average 50,774 Danish Kroner, henceforth abbreviated as DKK. Unsurprisingly, mean
real annual earnings also vary a lot between ethnic groups and gender. For men, mean
real annual earnings seven years after immigration range from 40,872 DKK for Palestinian
refugees from Lebanon to 76,945 DKK for Polish refugees. For women, mean real annual
earnings range from 37,168 DKK for Iranians to 61,798 DKK for Poles. For comparison,
mean real annual earnings conditional on having positive earnings of the overall Danish
population aged 18-59 ﬂuctuated between 114,644 and 126,951 DKK for men and 68,230
and 86,066 DKK for women in the period 1986-1998.
Table II shows summary statistics for highest completed educational level and mean
ethnic group size seven years after immigration by ethnic group which may help explain
16Table III
Mean ethnic group size in the year of immigration.
Refugee cohort No. of individuals Mean
1983 cohort 359 395.4 (555.2)
1984 cohort 1,277 288.3 (389.9)
1985 cohort 4,309 190.3 (285.1)
1986 cohort 3,657 132.6 (258.9)
1987 cohort 1,855 224.3 (350.9)
1988 cohort 1,430 255.9 (334.9)
1989 cohort 1,651 268.0 (315.5)
1990 cohort 1,215 335.8 (337.4)
1991 cohort 1,343 337.4 (470.5)
1992 cohort 1,587 422.5 (550.5)
1993 cohort 1,189 381.2 (515.5)
Refugee sample 13,927 265.3 (399.3)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
the variation in employment rate and mean real annual earnings between ethnic groups.13
The fraction of sampled individuals who is known to have completed a professional degree
of education varies from 0.06 for Vietnamese refugees to 0.28 for Poles and Rumanians.
The summary statistics for ethnic group size seven years after immigration by ethnic group
also reported in Table II show that mean ethnic group size varies from 83 for Rumanians
to 1,482 for Somalis.
Summary statistics for the full sample are reported in Table A.II in the Appendix.
III.F. Natural Variation in Ethnic Group Size
Did the spatial dispersal policy provide ’natural’ variation in the ethnic enclave size
of refugees? To answer this question I ﬁrst compare the initial settlement pattern of
refugees who were granted a permit to stay before the implementation of the spatial
dispersal policy with the initial settlement pattern of refugees in the sample, henceforth
referred to as pre-reform refugees.
Initial settlement of pre-reform refugees is deﬁned as their settlement one year after
immigration. This deﬁnition of initial settlement allows us to use three pre-reform cohorts
of refugees as comparison groups, the 1983-1985 cohorts of refugees from the 11 main
refugee-sending countries between 1986 and 1997. In addition, it takes into account that
13Unfortunately information on the highest completed educational level is missing for between 44% and
67% of the sampled individuals in each ethnic group. These are individuals who have not completed any
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function for initial ethnic group size. By refugee cohort.
pre-reform refugees may initially have lived in temporary housing in another municipality
than the initial municipality of permanent housing.
Comparison of the geographical settlement pattern of the pre-reform refugees with that
of refugees in the refugee sample indicates that the dispersal policy on refugees aﬀected
the initial settlement pattern of refugees considerably.
First, the dispersal policy increased the geographical dispersion of refugees across mu-
nicipalities. 60%, i.e. the majority, of the 1983 and 1984 cohorts initially lived in one
of the four largest municipalities as compared to only 31.5% of refugees in the refugee
sample. In addition, both the share of refugees who were initially settled in a small munic-
ipality and the share of refugees who were initially settled in a medium-sized municipality
increased substantially. 2.7% of the 1983 and 1984 cohorts initially lived in a small mu-
nicipality as compared to 9.3% of refugees in the refugee sample while 37.6% of the 1983
and 1984 cohorts initially lived in a medium-sized municipality as compared to 59.2%
of refugees in the refugee sample. Note however, that the tendency towards increased
dispersion across municipalities started with the 1985 cohort of refugees, that is one year
prior to implementation of the dispersal policy. This was caused by lack of housing in the
large cities in 1985.
Secondly, Table III presents evidence that the dispersal policy reduced the mean initial
ethnic group size of refugees. This is seen by noting that the mean initial ethnic group
size of the 1986-1988 cohorts of refugees is signiﬁcantly lower than the mean initial ethnic
group size of the 1983 and 1984 cohorts of refugees despite an increase in ethnic stock over
time of all ethnic groups as documented in Table A.III in the Appendix. This increase in
ethnic stock together with the fact that the Council aimed at dispersing refugees in
18Table IV
Mean ethnic group size seven years after immigration.
Refugee cohort No. of individuals Mean
1983 cohort 374 639.3 (645.4)
1984 cohort 1,142 790.0 (643.7)
1985 cohort 3,863 675.4 (701.6)
1986 cohort 3,657 600.8 (781.2)
1987 cohort 1,855 859.5 (943.3)
1988 cohort 1,430 930.2 (991.5)
1989 cohort 1,651 1,078.3 (1,131.2)
1990 cohort 1,215 1,153.5 (1,214.3)
1991 cohort 1,343 1,219.6 (1,304.7)
1992 cohort 1,587 1,414.6 (1,462.5)
1993 cohort 1,189 1,580.1 (1,595.3)
Refugee sample 13,927 1,009.9 (1,176.9)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
clusters of co-nationals explains the increase in the mean initial ethnic group size over
time and cohorts in spite of continued spatial dispersal of new cohorts of refugees.
Finally, evidence is presented in Figure 1 that the dispersal policy shifted the overall
cumulative distribution function of initial ethnic group size to the left, especially at the
top of the distribution. The shift is most spectacular for the 1986 cohort of refugees
relative to the 1983 and 1984 cohort of refugees. Over time the cumulative distribution
function of post-reform refugees shifts to the right due to the increase in ethnic stock over
time and due to dispersal of refugees in clusters of co-nationals, but despite increases in
ethnic stocks over time the cumulative distribution function of the 1983 cohort dominates
that of the 1986-1988 cohorts and the cumulative distribution function of the 1984 cohort
dominates that of the 1986 cohort.
There is ample evidence that the dispersal policy aﬀected the settlement pattern of
refugees even in the medium-run.
First, post-reform refugees are still overrepresented in small and medium-sized mu-
nicipalities relative to pre-reform refugees seven years after immigration. Seven years
after immigration 45% of individuals in the refugee sample live in a large municipality as
compared to 58 and 64% of the 1983 and 1984 cohorts of refugees, respectively.
Second, as reported in Table IV seven years after immigration the 1986 cohort on
a v e r a g es t i l lh a sas i g n i ﬁcantly lower ethnic group size than 1984 and 1985 cohorts of
refugees. In contrast, 1987-1993 cohorts of refugees on average have a signiﬁcantly higher
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function for ethnic group size seven years after immi-
gration. By refugee cohort.
Third, Figure 2 shows that the cumulative distribution function for ethnic group size
seven years after immigration of 1983 and 1984 cohorts of refugees lies to the right of that
of the ﬁrst cohorts of post-reform refugees for low and intermediate ethnic group size. In
other words, seven years after immigration the ﬁrst cohorts of post-reform refugees have
a higher tendency to live in municipalities with a low or intermediate ethnic group size
relative to pre-reform refugees.
The evidence presented in this subsection shows that on average refugees who were
subject to the dispersal policy received lower levels of treatment than they would have
received otherwise. In other words, the dispersal policy created natural variation in the
ethnic enclave size of refugees.
IV. Empirical Results
IV.A. Employment Eﬀects of Ethnic Group Size
Table V reports the estimation results of the model given by Equations (1) and (2) in
which ethnic group size seven years after immigration is treated as a weakly exogenous
explanatory variable. The model is estimated using the probit estimator, i.e. under
the assumption that the error term in Equation (2) is n.i.d. distributed. The probit
estimates using the full sample show that controlling for other observed characteristics
of the individual and for three types of ﬁxed eﬀects, the logarithmic value of ethnic
group size on average has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the employment probability of
the individual. Next, the sample is divided into two sub-samples, for low-educated and
20higher-educated individuals respectively. The sub-sample of higher-educated individuals
is constituted by individuals who have completed at least thirteen years of education. On
average the logarithmic value of ethnic group size has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the
employment probability for both sub-samples. That is, according to the probit estimates,
current residence in an ethnic enclave is harmful to employment of refugees, irrespective
of educational level.
We now test whether ethnic group size seven years after immigration is in fact weakly
exogenous in the model given by Equations (1) and (2). This is tested using an instrument.
The instrument contains the subset of the candidates for identifying variables of the eﬀect
of ethnic group size that gives the best linear predictor among the instruments for which
the test of over-identifying variables cannot be rejected.
Summary statistics of the eight candidates for identifying variables, the number of
co-nationals placed in the municipality of assignment of individual i in year t, t =
−7,−6,...,0,w h e r et denotes the number of years since immigration of individual i,a r e
presented in Table A.II in the Appendix. The mean value of the number of co-nationals
placed in the municipality of assignment is seen to increase with t. The reason is that a
substantial share of refugees were assigned to municipalities which had received cohorts
of placed refugees only in the recent, say 1 and 2 years. In that case the number of
co-nationals placed in the municipality of assignment of individual i in year t takes the
value 0 for t lower than −2. The mean of the number of placed co-nationals in year 0
is 23, indicating that on average new refugees were distributed across municipalities in
clusters of 23 co-nationals. It turns out that the number of co-nationals placed in the
municipality of assignment in year 0 is included in the instrument used in estimations for
the overall sample and for every subsample.
The strength of the instrument can be inferred from Table VI. The results of the F-
tests on excluded variables in which the identifying variables, the number of co-nationals
placed in the municipality of assignment in year t, is excluded in the ﬁrst stage regres-
sion conﬁrm that the identifying variables are strongly correlated with the endogenous
explanatory variable we are instrumenting, the logarithmic value of current ethnic group
size. Similarly, the partial R2 values which show how much inclusion of the identifying
v a r i a b l e si m p r o v e sR 2 of the ﬁrst stage regression model are relatively high for all three
samples.
Over-identiﬁcation test results are also reported in Table VI. The null hypothesis
of orthogonality between the instrument and the error term in Equation (2) cannot be
rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels for any of the (sub-) samples. This indicates
that the identifying variables are valid exclusion restrictions.
Turning to the results of the test for weak exogeneity of ethnic group size, they are
reported in Table VII. The t-test for weak exogeneity of ethnic group size is rejected for
21Table V
Model estimates. Dependent variable: Pr(employed).
Sample Full Low-educated Higher-educated
Estimator: Probit AGLS Probit AGLS Probit AGLS
ln(ethnic group size) -.060*** .123** -.056*** .087 -.082*** .172*
(.009) (.059) (.010) (.065) (.023) (.091)
Woman -.516*** -.516*** -.541*** -.535*** -.347** -.376***
(.054) (.055) (.059) (.059) (.152) (.153)
Age .085*** .086*** .100*** .099*** .063 .108**
(.0153) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.050) (.050)
Age squared -.002*** -.002*** -.002*** -.002*** -.001** -.002***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0006) (.0006)
Married .093*** .084** .078** .067* .259*** .251***
(.036) (.036) (.039) (.040) (.100) (.101)
Woman*Married -0.101 -0.089 -0.084 -.081 -0.186 -0.149
(0.063) (0.063) (0.068) (.069) (0.171) (0.173)
Young children -.300*** -.293*** -.296*** -.284*** -.286*** -.316***
(.031) (.031) (.034) (.034) (.082) (.083)
Older children -.069** -.021 -.110*** -.061* .108 .116
(.031) (.033) (.035) (.036) (.080) (.081)
High school degree .040 .040 .044 .046
(.053) (.054) (.054) (.054)
Professional degree .179*** .178***
(.058) (.058)
ln(ethnic stock) -.154** -.268*** -.220*** -.314*** 0.271 .179
(.077) (.086) (.084) (.094) (.565) (.213)
No. of individuals 13,661 11,577 1,959
No. of parameters 241 236 142
Log likelihood value -7,314 -6,060 -1,124
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.133 0.104
Notes: Additional controls are year of immigration, ethnic group and municipality of as-
signment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks indicate
signiﬁcance at a 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively. Low-educated individuals are
deﬁned as individuals with less than 13 years of schooling.
t h ef u l ls a m p l ea tac o n v e n t i o n a l5 %s i g n i ﬁcance level and for the sub-sample of low-
educated individuals at a 10% signiﬁcance level. AGLS estimation of the instrumental
variables model given by Equations (3)-(6) should therefore result in consistent estimates
22Table VI
Test of over-identifying restrictions.
Sample Full Low-educated Higher-educated




Strength of identifying variables:
F-test on excluded variables 53***˜F(5,13648) 54***˜F(4,11557) 22***˜F(2,1882)
Partial R2 0.017 0.015 0.021
Notes: Three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at a 1% signiﬁcance level.
for the overall sample and for the sub-sample of low-educated individuals. In contrast,
due to lack of signiﬁcant location sorting by ability of higher-educated refugees, the probit
estimate of the eﬀect of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size should be consistent
for higher-educated refugees. The negative sign of the 2SCML estimate of the predicted
residual from ﬁrst stage regression indicates that low-educated refugees with relatively
unfavourable personal characteristics sort into ethnic enclaves.
The AGLS estimation results of the instrumental variables model are reported in
Table V. The results show that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the logarithmic
value of ethnic group size on average has a positive eﬀect on an individual’s employment
probability for the overall sample of refugees and for the sub-sample low- and higher-
educated refugees. However, the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant at a 10% signiﬁcance level for the
sub-sample of low-educated individuals.
The marginal eﬀect of logarithmic value of the ethnic group size calculated at the
mean of the distribution of observed characteristics is reported in Table VIII. For the
overall sample of refugees an increase of 1 in the logarithmic value of current ethnic group
size on average increases the employment probability seven years after immigration by 4
percentage points. At the mean of the distribution, an increase of 1 in the logarithmic
value of current ethnic group size corresponds to an increase in ethnic group size of 1,733
co-nationals (from 1,010 co-nationals to 2,742 co-nationals).
Turning to the sub-samples a log increase in current ethnic group size of 1 on average
increases the employment probability seven years after immigration by 2.8 percentage
points for low-educated individuals, but decreases the employment probability by 2.9
percentage points for high-educated individuals.
In theory there could be gender diﬀerences in the eﬀect of living in an ethnic enclave on
employment of recent immigrants. However, separate estimation of the average eﬀect of
ethnic enclave size on the employment probability for men and women indicates absence
of gender diﬀerences. The probit estimate of the eﬀect of the logarithmic value of ethnic
group size on the employment probability is signiﬁcantly negative for both sub-samples.
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Test for weak exogeneity of ln(ethnic group size). 2SCML estimates.
Sample Full Low-educated Higher-educated
ln(ethnic group size) .069 (.062) .084 (.076) .145 (.147)
Residuals from ﬁrst stage -.131** (.063) -.142* (.077) -.232 (.149)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One and two asterisks indicate signiﬁ-
cance at a 10 and 5% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
However, the estimated eﬀect of the residual from the ﬁrst stage regression indicates
evidence of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves of both men and women. But the
hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size cannot
be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. This is likely to be due to lack of degrees
of freedom. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by instrumenting the logarithmic
value of current ethnic group size, the AGLS estimate shows that the logarithmic value
of the ethnic group size signiﬁcantly increases the employment probability of both men
and women. The marginal eﬀect calculated at the mean of the distribution shows that
an increase of 1 of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size on average increases the
employment probability seven years after immigration by 4.7 percentage points for men
and 3.4 percentage points for women.
In conclusion, seven years after immigration ethnic group size on average promotes
employment of refugees. This result could be driven by a positive eﬀect of current ethnic
group size on employment chances for low-educated refugees, because the results do not
allow us to draw strong conclusions on how living in an ethnic enclave aﬀects employment
chances of higher-educated refugees; the sub-sample of higher-educated refugees is too
small. Finally, there is no evidence of gender diﬀerences in the eﬀect of living in an ethnic
enclave on employment chances.
To interpret the economic signiﬁcance of the results I calculate the eﬀect of a standard
deviation (1,176) increase in ethnic group size relative to its mean of 1,010 co-nationals.
Such a relative standard deviation increase corresponds to a 116% increase of ethnic group
size and to a log increase of 1.022. For the overall sample, a relative standard deviation
increase in ethnic group size seven years after immigration therefore on average increases
an individual’s employment probability by (1.022*0.04=) 0.04, i.e. 4 percentage points.
IV.B. Earnings Eﬀects of Ethnic Group Size
This subsection investigates how living in an ethnic enclave aﬀects real annual earnings
of recent immigrants by estimating two earnings models for the sub-sample of refugees who
have positive earnings seven years after immigration. The ﬁrst model to be estimated is a
model in which ethnic group size seven years after immigration is assumed to be weakly
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Marginal eﬀects of ln(ethnic group size) on Pr(employed) seven years after immigration.
Probit Exogeneity test AGLS
Full sample -.020*** (.003) -.044** (.021) .040** (.019)
Low-educated sample -.018*** (.003) -.046* (.025) .028 (.021)
Higher-educated sample -.029*** (.008) -.083 (.053) .060* (.032)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks indicate
signiﬁcance at a 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively. The reported marginal eﬀects are
the marginal eﬀects for an individual in the estimation sample with mean characteristics.
exogenous. In that case ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of a model in which
earnings of individual i seven years after immigration is regressed on the ethnic group size
of individual i seven years after immigration as well as observed personal characteristics,
year of immigration, ethnic group and municipality of assignment, yields a consistent
estimate of the eﬀect of ethnic group size seven years after immigration on earnings of
employed individuals.
The second model to be estimated is a model in which ethnic group size seven years
after immigration is treated as an endogenous variable. In this model ethnic group size
seven years after immigration is instrumented by the subset of the candidates for identi-
fying variables of the eﬀect of ethnic group size that gives the best linear predictor among
the instruments for which the test of over-identifying variables cannot be rejected. The
model is estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation.
The estimates of the marginal eﬀect of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size
on real annual earnings for the sub-sample of refugees in the refugee sample who have
positive earnings seven years after immigration are reported in Table IX. OLS estimation
yields a negative and signiﬁcant estimate of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size
on earnings for the overall sample of refugees with positive earnings seven years after
immigration. However, the test results reported in column 4, Table IX, shows that the
null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size is rejected.
The negative sign of the test score indicates negative self-selection of refugees into ethnic
enclaves. The over-identiﬁcation test statistic is reported in column 3, Table IX. The
over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels for the
overall sample or for any of the sub-samples.
The instrumental variables estimate of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size on
earnings is reported in column 5, Table IX. Taking account of location sorting, the earnings
elasticity of ethnic group size is estimated to be 18.9% in the overall sample, i.e. a
percentage increase in ethnic group size increases earnings by 18.9%.
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Marginal eﬀects of ln(ethnic group size) on ln(real annual earnings) seven years after
immigration.
OLS Over-identiﬁcation test Exogeneity test 2SLS
Full sample -.066*** 2.26˜χ2
3 -.260*** .189*
(.014) (.100) (.103)
Low-educated sample -.052*** 4.75˜χ2
2 -.218** .160
(.016) (.102) (.104)
Higher-educated sample -.134*** 1.35˜χ2
2 -.317 .172
(.034) (.218) (.229)
Notes: Robust standard errors, allowing for correlation between individuals residing in the
same municipality, are reported in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance
at a 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively. The controls are the same as the controls in
the estimated employment models, see Table V. Number of observations: 5,647.
Turning to the results for the sub-samples of low-educated and higher-educated, the
OLS estimate of the eﬀect of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size on earnings is
negative and signiﬁcant. However, the results of the test for weak exogeneity of the loga-
rithmic value of the ethnic group size show signiﬁcant evidence of negative self-selection
into ethnic enclaves for low-educated individuals. Therefore, 2SLS estimation is required
to obtain a consistent estimate of the eﬀect of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group
size on earnings for low-educated refugees. In contrast, the OLS estimate of a negative
eﬀect of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size on earnings reported in column
2, Table X, should be consistent for the sub-sample of higher-educated individuals. The
2SLS estimate of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size is positive but insigniﬁcant
at a 10% signiﬁcance level for low-educated refugees. As in the case of the employment
a n a l y s i s ,i tc a n n o tb er u l e do u tt h a tt h ee s t i m a t eo fap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of the logarithmic
value of the ethnic group size on earnings for the overall sample is driven by a positive
eﬀect for low-educated refugees only.
Does living in an ethnic enclave aﬀect earnings of men and women in the same way?
This is investigated by separate estimation of the eﬀe c to ft h el o g a r i t h m i cv a l u eo fe t h n i c
group size on real annual earnings for men and women. OLS estimation yields a negative
and signiﬁcant estimate of the eﬀect for both sub-samples. However, the null hypothesis
of weak exogeneity of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size seven years after
immigration is rejected for the sub-sample of men and the sub-sample of low-educated
women. This indicates that 2SLS estimation is required to consistently estimate the eﬀect
of the logarithmic value of ethnic group size on earnings of men and of low-educated
26women, while the OLS estimates of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size should
be consistent for the sub-samples of higher-educated men and women.
Overall, the results suggest that living in an ethnic enclave increases real annual earn-
ings of low-educated individuals, irrespective of gender. However, living in an ethnic
enclave may decrease real annual earnings of higher-educated individuals, irrespective of
gender.
Finally, in order to determine the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of the logarithmic
value of the ethnic group size on earnings, I calculate the eﬀect of a relative standard
deviation increase of ethnic group size seven years after immigration on earnings seven
years after immigration. For the overall sample, a relative standard deviation increase in
ethnic group size seven years after immigration corresponds to an increase of log earnings
by (1.022*0.189=) 0.193 which corresponds to a 21% earnings increase. Similarly, a
relative standard deviation increase in ethnic group size seven years after immigration
is estimated to increase earnings of the low-educated by 18%. This is similar to the
estimate of a relative standard deviation increase in ethnic group size on earnings for
the low-educated in Edin et al. (2003). According to their estimate, a relative standard
deviation increase in ethnic group size increases earnings of the low-educated by 13%.
IV.C. Speciﬁcation Checks
Do the results hold irrespective of ethnic group? To investigate this I have divided
the sample into four subsamples based on region of origin (Middle-East, Asia, Africa and
Eastern-Europa or South-America and estimated the employment and earnings models for
each subsample. The results show evidence of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves
for refugees from the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europa and South America, however
only signiﬁcantly so for refugees from Asia. The IV-estimates are signiﬁcant and positive
for refugees from the Middle East (in the employment model only) and Asians. Lack of
rejection of the test of weak exogeneity of the logarithmic value of the ethnic group size
in the estimated models for Africans and Eastern Europe or South America could be due
to lack of observations.
Could the results be driven by the fact that the instrument is weak for the subsample
of refugees who belong to the ethnic groups who at the time of introduction of spatial
dispersal policy had a relatively large ethnic stock in Denmark? To investigate this I have
ﬁrst reestimated the employment and earnings models excluding refugees from Poland
from the sample. The results of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves and a positive
eﬀect of an increase in ethnic group size on the employment probability and earnings
are robust to the exclusion of refugees from Poland. Second, I have reestimated the
employment and earnings models excluding refugees from Vietnam. All results, except
for signiﬁcance of the positive eﬀect of an increase in the ethnic group size on earnings,
27are robust to this exclusion. Thirdly, for the subsamples of refugees from the Middle East
and Asia, the results of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves and a positive eﬀect
of an increase in the ethnic group size on the employment probability seven years after
immigration are robust to the use of an instrument which is strong also for the subset of
refugees with relatively large ethnic stocks in Denmark at the time of implementation of
the dispersal policy, namely the logarithmic value of the initial ethnic stock.
Finally, I have investigated whether the eﬀect of an increase in ethnic group size on the
employment probability and earnings is in fact non-linear. I have tested this hypothesis
by estimating the eﬀect of the ethnic group size and the ethnic group size squared on the
employment probability and earnings seven years after immigration, controlling for the
same observed characteristics as those reported in Table V. In the employment model the
probit estimate of ethnic group size is negative and signiﬁcant, while the probit estimate of
ethnic group size squared is positive but insigniﬁcant. The tests of weak exogeneity of each
of the two variables cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. In the earnings
model, the OLS estimates of the ethnic group size and the ethnic group size squared are
both negative and insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the test for weak exogeneity of each of
these variables are not rejected. The instrument contains the subset of the candidates for
identifying variables of the eﬀect of ethnic group size that gives the best linear predictor
among the instruments for which the test of over-identifying variables cannot be rejected.
The candidates for identifying variables are the number of co-nationals placed in the
municipality of assignment in year t, t = −7,−6,...,0, and the number of conationals
placed in the municipality of assignment in year 0 squared. As a consequence, I reject
the hypotheses that an increase in the ethnic group size has a non-linear eﬀect on the
employment probability and earnings seven years after immigration.
IV.D. Network Mechanisms?
The results suggest that ethnic networks promote employment of refugees seven years
after immigration. But how? Do ethnic networks promote self-employment or wage-
employment or both? To answer this question I estimate the eﬀect of the logarithmic
value of ethnic group size on the probability of being self-employed seven years after
immigration and on the probability of being a wage-earner (with on average at least
9 hours per week during the year). Summary statistics for the dependent variables in
these models, i.e. the self-employment rate and wage employment rate seven years after
immigration are reported by ethnic group and for the overall sample in Table A.IV in the
Appendix. The estimation results are reported in Table X.
According to the probit estimation results for the self-employment model the relation-
ship between ethnic group size and the probability of being self-employed seven years after
immigration is insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the test of weak exogeneity of the logarithmic
28Table X
Marginal eﬀects of ln(ethnic group size) on Pr(self-employment) and Pr(wage-employment)
seven years after immigration.
Pr(self-employment) Pr(wage-employment)
Sample Probit Exogeneity test Probit Exogeneity test AGLS
Full 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0203*** -0.0467*** 0.0392**
(0.0014) (0.0100) (0.0025) (0.0184) (0.0154)
Low-educated -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0179*** -0.0444** 0.0378**
(0.0015) (0.0115) (0.0028) (0.0205) (0.0168)
Higher-educated 0.0042 -0.0025 -0.0348*** -0.0896* 0.0692**
(0.0047) (0.0337) (0.0072) (0.0480) (0.0270)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks indicate
signiﬁcance at a 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively. The controls are the same as the
controls in the estimated employment models, see Table V.
value of ethnic group size is not rejected in the self-employment model. In other words,
there is no evidence of self-selection into ethnic enclaves. As a consequence, the probit es-
timates should be consistent. In contrast, the estimation results for the wage-employment
model show signiﬁcant evidence of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves. Controlling
for such self-selection, the AGLS results show that an increase in ethnic group size seven
years after immigration signiﬁcantly increases the probability of being a wage-earner seven
years after immigration. Comparison of the results in Table X with the results in Table V
suggests that the positive eﬀect of ethnic group size on the probability of being employed
seven years after immigration is due to the result reported in Table X that an increase
in ethnic group size increases the probabality of obtaining a job as a wage earner seven
years after immigration. In other words, ethnic networks appear to promote employment
of refugees seven years after immigration because access to ethnic networks increase the
probability of being a wage earner seven years after immigration. Access to ethnic net-
works may for that matter increase the probability of being of wage earner either by
increasing the chances of getting job oﬀers, possibly from co-ethnic ﬁrms, or by increasing
the job search eﬀorts due to social norms in the ethnic group endorsing self-suﬃciency
through wage employment.
V. A LATE Interpretation of the Instrumental Variables Estimates
Conventional applications of the method of instrumental variables assume a constant
treatment eﬀect for all unit increases in the treatment intensity and all individuals with
the same observable characteristics. In that case, the instrumental variables estimand
29identiﬁes the average treatment eﬀect in a population of interest and in a subpopulation
of the treated. In the current setting, the assumption of a constant unit treatment eﬀect
means that the labour market gain of living in a location with a given ethnic group size
is constant for all levels of ethnic group size and for all persons with the same X1.T h i si s
a strong assumption. But what kind of treatment eﬀect does the instrumental variables
estimand identify if we relax this assumption?
In case of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects for individuals with the same X1,t h ei n s t r u -
mental variables estimand will still identify the average treatment eﬀect and the treatment
eﬀect of the treated if one is willing to assume that agents do not select into the program
on the basis of the idiosyncratic component of their response to the program (Heckman
and Robb 1985; 1986). This assumption implies that refugees do not sort into ethnic
enclaves based on the idiosyncratic component of their return to living in a location with
a given ethnic group size. This is also a strong assumption.
However, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that in the case of heterogeneous treatment
eﬀect the instrumental variables estimand still identiﬁes a treatment eﬀect under the
weak assumption of monotonicity, i.e. if all individuals are shifted by the instrument
in a monotone way. Under the monotonicity assumption, the instrumental variables
estimand identiﬁes the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE). In the current context of a
multi-valued treatment variable, LATE is the average treatment eﬀect for individuals who
are induced to change treatment intensity (rather than treatment status) by changing
an exogenous regressor that satisﬁes an exclusion restriction, see Angrist and Imbens
(1995).14 This group of individuals is called compliers, switchers and persons at the
margin of being treated.
Relative to average treatment eﬀects (ATE) and average treatment eﬀects on the
treated (ATT), LATE has two drawbacks. First, it measures the eﬀect of treatment on
a generally unidentiﬁable subpopulation, namely the individuals who are shifted by the
instrument. The subgroup of compliers is unidentiﬁable because membership involves un-
observed counterfactual treatment intensities. Second, LATE depends on the particular
instrumental variable that we have available because the instrument determines the sub-
group of compliers. However, the LATE assumptions impose weaker assumptions on the
counterfactual data than the classical selection model ﬁrst proposed by Heckman (1976) in
which one imposes parametric functional form distributional assumptions (Vytlacil 2002).
I will now investigate whether one can argue that the instrumental variables estimand
identiﬁes a LATE in the current context. Such investigation requires investigation of
whether the monotonicity assumption is satisﬁed and if so, who the compliers are.
14In the case of binary treatment LATE is E[Y1−Y0|D(z)=1 ,D(z0)=0 ]where Yj is a discrete random
variable of counterfactual response to treatment intensity j ,Z is the instrument and D is an indicator
variable for programme participation and z 6= z0.
30V.A. Monotone Treatment
To investigate whether the monotonicity assumption is satisﬁed, let us reformulate our
problem as an evaluation problem. Let Ez be a discrete random variable of the counterfac-
tual multi-valued treatment intensity, i.e. ethnic group size seven years after immigration
conditional on the instrument Z, e =1 ,...,J. Furthermore, let Yj be a discrete random
variable of counterfactual (labour market outcome) response to treatment intensity j.T o
simplify the exposition, let there only be one multi-valued, discrete identifying variable in
Z, e.g. the number of co-nationals placed in the municipality of assignment in the year
of immigration, z =0 ,...,K.
The monotonicity assumption will be satisﬁed if with probability 1, either Ek ≥ Ek−1or
Ek ≤ Ek−1for all k and for each person with the same X1. In the ethnic enclave context,
monotonicity means that because of spatial dispersal in a cluster of k co-nationals, either
refugees dispersed in a cluster of k co-nationals have at least as large an ethnic group size
seven years after immigration as refugees dispersed in a cluster of k − 1 co-nationals or
vice versa. This assumption has the testable implication that the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of Ek and Ek−1 should not cross, because if, say, Ek ≥ Ek−1for all k with
probability 1, then Pr(Ek ≥ j) ≥ Pr(Ek−1 ≥ j) for all j. This implies Pr(Ez ≥ j|Z =
k) ≥ Pr(Ez ≥ j|Z = k − 1) or FEz(j|Z = k) ≥ FEz(j|Z = k − 1),w h e r eFEz is the CDF
of Ez, see e.g. Angrist and Imbens (1995).
For each of the eight potential identifying variable candidates, the number of co-
nationals placed in the municipality of assignment in the year t, t = −7,−6,...,0,I
investigate empirically whether the candidate satisﬁes the testable implication of the
m o n o t o n i c i t ya s s u m p t i o n .T h i si sd o n eb yﬁrst rescaling each identifying variable into a
new discrete variable Z0, z0 =0 ,...,K0,w h e r eK0 is substantially smaller than K.15
Figure 3 presents empirical evidence that the monotonicity assumption is approxi-
mately satisﬁed for the number of co-nationals placed in the year of assignment in the year
of immigration, even unconditional on X1. In particular, FEz0(j|Z0 = k) ≥ FEz0(j|Z0 =
k −1), i.e. the cumulative distributive function of ethnic group size seven years after im-
migration for individuals with a higher value of the instrument stochastically dominates
the cumulative distributive function of ethnic group size seven years after immigration
for individuals with a lower value of the instrument. This means that refugees dispersed
in a cluster of k co-nationals have at least as large an ethnic group size seven years after
immigration as refugees dispersed in a cluster of k −1 co-nationals. This result rules out
15For instance, for Z equal to the number of co-nationals placed in the municipality of assignment in
the year of immigration, Z0 =0for Z =[ 0 ,4], Z0 =1for Z =[ 5 ,9], Z0 =2for Z =[ 1 0 ,14], Z´= 3
for Z =[ 1 5 ,19], Z0 =4for Z =[ 2 0 ,24], Z0 =5for Z =[ 2 5 ,29], Z0 =6for Z =[ 3 0 ,34], Z0 =7for
Z=[ 3 5 ,39], Z0 =8for Z =[ 4 0 ,44], Z0 =9for Z =[ 4 5 ,54], Z0 =1 0for Z =[ 5 5 ,69], Z0 =1 1for






















































































Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function for ethnic group size seven years after immi-
gration. By treatment intensity.
the existence of a subgroup of deﬁers, i.e. a subset of refugees dispersed in a cluster of k
co-nationals have a lower ethnic group size seven years after immigration than refugees
dispersed in a cluster of k − 1 co-nationals.16 The result is important empirical evidence
in support of the claim that in case of heterogenous treatment eﬀects, the instrumental
variable estimand identiﬁes LATE.
Figure 4 is a plot of the diﬀerences in the CDF for ethnic group size seven years
after immigration for Z equal to the number of co-nationals placed in the municipality
of assignment in the year of immigration and for Z0 =0and Z0 =1 1 , normalized to
1. The ﬁgure illustrates which treatment intensity groups contribute most to the LATE.
The function declines at an ethnic group size seven years after immigration of 868 co-
nationals, implying that for Z0 =0relative to Z0 =1 1most of the contribution to LATE
comes from groups at the lower end of the distribution of ethnic group size seven years
after immigration. This result is in accordance with the economic model for programme
participation that I present shortly. According to the model, the dispersal policy aﬀects
mainly refugees who do not want to live in a large ethnic enclave at any prize, i.e. irrespec-
tive of the expected migration costs relative to the expected net beneﬁts of relocation to
a larger ethnic enclave. Further evidence, not presented here, shows that for all adjacent
pairs of Z = k and Z = k−1, most of the contribution to LATE comes from groups with
low and intermediate treatment intensities.
V.B. Compliers
16Empirical evidence that the monotonicity assumption is approximately satisﬁed for the seven remain-

















































































Figure 4: Diﬀerence in ethnic group size CDF for Z’=0 and Z’=11.
Recall that LATE is the mean impact on compliers. Who are the compliers in the
current setting? The evidence presented in Section III.F indicates that it is the subgroup
of placed refugees who take treatment at a lower level than they would have done in the
absence of the policy and if they had received a higher value of the instrument. How did
the dispersal policy induce any placed refugees to change their treatment intensity?
A placed refugee faces a problem of ﬁnding an optimal location in the host country, i.e.
he has to decide whether or not to move away from the municipality of assignment which
in the evaluation framework corresponds to the decision of whether or not to participate in
the dispersal programme and take treatment at the assigned treatment intensity. I argue
that the non-participation decision of a placed refugee can be modeled by the migration
model by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) according to which the potential migrant (non-
participant) weighs the net expected pecuniary and mental beneﬁts of migration against
the expected pecuniary and mental costs of migration. Migration (non-participation) will
occur, if the former exceeds the latter. In other words, the potential programme partic-
i p a n t( ap l a c e dr e f u g e e )m a k e sh i sp a r t i c i p a tion decision by weighing the expected costs
of non-participation against the net expected beneﬁts of non-participation. The candi-
dates for identifying variables, the number of placed co-nationals in the municipality of
assignment in year t, t = −7,−6,...,0, are potentially important determinants of non-
participation. The reason is that placed refugees are likely to derive high utility from
living in the same location as co-nationals according to the ethnic network hypothesis by
Piore (1979) and Kobrin and Speare (1983) and the ethnic goods hypothesis by Chiswick
and Miller (2005). These two hypotheses imply that the expected utility gain decreases
and the expected costs of non-compliance increase with the value of the candidates for
33identifying variables. Therefore, the value of the candidates for identifying variables un-
ambigously decreases the migration probability. To test this hypothesis I regress the
programme participation status of individual i seven years after immigration on the loga-
rithmic value of the candidates for identifying variables, controlling for personal attributes
and other regional attributes of the municipality of assignment. The vector of personal
attributes contains two sets of controls, ﬁrst controls for the personal attributes which
may have aﬀected the initial location: marital status, children indicators, age and size of
the ethnic stock at the time of immigration as well as year of immigration and country of
origin and second, additional personal attributes which may aﬀect the programme partic-
ipation decision: gender and years of education. The vector of regional attributes of the
municipality of assignment contain initial values of: 1) demographic attributes, 2) labour
market attributes and 3) housing market attributes of the municipality of assignment of
potential importance for the programme participation decision.
The estimation results are shown in Table XI. They show that ceteris paribus refugees
were more likely to have moved away from the municipality of assignment seven years
after immigration, the smaller the logarithmic value of three of the candidates for iden-
tifying variables, speciﬁcally the smaller the value of ln(number of co-nationals placed in
the municipality of assignment in year t), t = −4,−1,0. The logarithmic value of the
remaining candidates for identifying variables, ln(number of co-nationals placed in the
municipality of assignment in year t), t = −7,−6,−5,−2, had an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on
the probability of migration in a speciﬁcation in which all potential identifying variables
were included. However, estimation results not reported here, show that ceteris paribus,
the logarithmic value of every candidate for identifying variable has a signiﬁcant and
negative eﬀect on the probability of migration, in speciﬁcations in which each candidate
for identifying variable is included separately. This supports the view that individual i’s
decision on whether or not to accept the assignment to a given level of treatment was
aﬀected by the instrument, Zi=[ln(number of co-nationals placed in the municipality of
assignment in year t)], t = −7,−6,...,0, through an economic model.
Further empirical evidence in support of this view is the result that the cumulative
distribution function for initial ethnic group size of movers is seen to dominate that of
stayers, indicating that programme participants are overrepresented among refugees who
were assigned to treatment at a relatively high level.
The migration results suggest that movers are attracted to municipalities in which
a larger share of their co-nationals lives. That this is indeed the case is supported by
the evidence that the cumulative distribution function for ethnic group size seven years
after immigration of stayers dominates that of movers at intermediate ethnic group size,
i.e. seven years after immigration non-participants (movers) are overrepresented among
refugees who live in a municipality with a relatively large ethnic group size seven years
34Table XI
Probit estimation of the Pr(having moved out of the municipality of assignment seven years
after immigration). Marginal eﬀects.





Young children -.006 (.013)
Older children -.049*** (.014)
ln(ethnic stock) -.050* (-.050)
High school level -.004 (.021)
University level .004 (.023)
Highest degree missing .008 (.020)
Regional attributes of the municipality of assignment:
Medium .250*** (.024)
Small .340*** (.025)
ln(number of immigrants) -.015 (.010)
ln(number of placed co-nationals in year 0) -.043*** (.005)
ln(number of placed co-nationals in year -1) -.001** (.001)
ln(number of placed co-nationals in year -4) -.002*** (.001)
Local unemployment rate .010*** (.003)
% right-wing votes .001 (.001)
Number of educ. institutions .004*** (.001)
% county jobs -.005* (.003)
% social housing -.008*** (.001)
Log likelihood -8,248.11
Notes: One, two and three asterisks respectively indicate signiﬁcance at a 10, 5 and 1%
signiﬁcance level. Additional controls are year of immigration and country of origin. Excluded
categories are: education level: basic (less than 10 years), municipality size category: large.
Number of observations: 13,927. Number of movers: 7,266.
after immigration. Further descriptive evidence reveals that after relocation movers on
average live in municipalities with a signiﬁcantly larger local population in which immi-
grants constitute a signiﬁcantly larger share of the local population and with signiﬁcantly
larger number of co-nationals than stayers.
The result that stayers are overrepresented among refugees who were assigned to a
municipality with a relatively large number of co-nationals initially and underrepresented
35among refugees with a relatively large number of co-nationals in the municipality of res-
idence seven years after immigration is intuitive: For these individuals the number of
co-nationals in the municipality of assignment was so close to their preferred (large) num-
b e ro fc o - n a t i o n a l st h a tt h ec o s t so fr e l o c a t i o nt oam u n i c i p a l i t yw i t ha ne v e nl a r g e r
number of co-nationals exceeded the beneﬁts from relocation to such a municipality.
I conclude that in the case of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects, the instrumental vari-
ables estimand identiﬁes the average eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on the labour market
outcome gain of the subgroup of refugees subject to the spatial dispersal policy who are
induced to decrease their ethnic group size seven years after immigration because opting
out of the dispersal programme after initial assignment to a municipality is costly due to
migration costs.17
VI. Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to estimate the average causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size
on labour market outcomes of immigrants, in particular the employment probability and
real annual earnings. Ethnic enclave size is measured as the number of co-nationals living
in the municipality of residence. Potential location by ability of individuals is taken into
account by exploiting the Danish spatial dispersal policy 1986-1998 under which refugees
were randomly assigned to locations conditional on six characteristics of the individual.
The ﬁndings fall into four categories. First, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of negative
self-selection into ethnic enclaves of the overall sample of refugees who were subject to
the Danish dispersal policy 1986-1998. Second, taking account of location sorting, the
ethnic enclave size is estimated to aﬀect economic success of refugees positively. A relative
standard deviation increase in ethnic enclave size on average increases the employment
probability of refugees by 4 percentage points and earnings by 21 percent. Third, I
present evidence that an increase in the ethnic enclave size increases the employment
probability of refugees by increasing the probability of wage-employment rather than self-
employment. Finally, I argue that the IV-estimates identify the average eﬀect of ethnic
enclave size on the labour market outcome gain of the subgroup of refugees subject to
the spatial dispersal policy who are induced to decrease their future ethnic enclave size
because opting out of the dispersal programme after initial assignment to a municipality
is costly due to migration costs.
Separate estimation of the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size for low- and higher-educated
individuals indicates that the result of negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves is driven
by negative self-selection into ethnic enclaves of low-educated individuals. Similarly, the
17Previous studies in which LATE is identiﬁed include evaluations based on natural experiments such
as Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1991).
36estimate of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on labour market out-
comes appear to be driven by a positive eﬀect of ethnic enclave size for low-educated
individuals only. The eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on economic success of higher-educated
appears to be negative and signiﬁcant. However, one may argue that a larger sample of
higher-educated refugees is necessary for drawing conclusions on the eﬀect of living in an
ethnic enclave on the economic success of high-educated refugees.
Separate estimation of the eﬀect of ethnic enclave size for male and female refugees
separately indicates that living in an ethnic enclave aﬀe c t sm e na n dw o m e ni nt h es a m e
way.
The ﬁnding of a positive and signiﬁcant average causal eﬀect of ethnic enclave size on
individual labour market outcomes may be interpreted as additional empirical evidence in
support of the importance of social networks for an individual’s labour market outcomes.
The data at hand does not allow for disentanglement of peer group eﬀects, e.g. work
attitudes, and social network eﬀects, e.g. social information spillover about job vacancies
and earnings opportunities, within the ethnic group. However, a likely interpretation
is that presence of co-nationals locally constitutes a network that conveys information
about wage-employment and earnings opportunities in the host country and that ethnic
enclaves constitute an environment in which the immigrant is less exposed to discrimi-
nation encountered elsewhere in the labour market. In contrast, ethnic enclaves do not
appear to be associated with social norms that hamper self-suﬃciency or employment
of female refugees such as traditional gender roles. In addition, the ﬁnding is empirical
evidence against the widespread belief that residential concentration of ethnic minorities
slows down host-country-speciﬁc human capital, e.g. host-country language proﬁciency,
and thereby damages labour market integration of immigrants. If residence in ethnic
enclaves does in fact slow down such acquisition, the ﬁndings of this analysis show that
there is more to the story of ethnic enclaves than that, most likely social network eﬀects,
which dominate the eﬀect of slow acquisition of host-country-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l ,a t
least for low-educated refugees.
Edin et al. (2003) report earnings ﬁndings which are similar to those reported in
this study. Taking account of location sorting, they estimate that a relative standard
deviation increase in ethnic enclave size increases earnings of the low-educated refugees
eight years after immigration by 13% while the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant for the overall sample
and high-educated individuals. They emphasize that their ﬁndings are consistent with a
story that ethnic enclaves are associated with ethnic enclave eﬀe c t st h a tp r i m a r i l yb e n e ﬁt
the least skilled. The ﬁndings of this study do not contradict that story.
The study was primarily concerned with the issue of whether the size of the ethnic
enclave matters to employment outcomes of immigrants. However, for policy recom-
mendation purposes further research is needed into why ethnic enclave size matters to
37immigrants’ labour market outcomes, i.e. research into the exact transmission mecha-
nisms of ethnic enclave size eﬀects. Important insights could arise, e.g. from empirical
disentanglement of peer group eﬀects from social information spillover.
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42Table A.I
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. Part A.
Variable Definition Primary source of data
Individual characteristics:
Woman Dummy for sex. Population register,
Statistics Denmark (DST).
Age Age. Population register, DST. 
Married Dummy for being married. Population register, DST. 
Young children Dummy for presence of children between Population register, DST. 
0 and 2 years of age in the household.
Older children Dummy for presence of children between Population register, DST. 
3 and 17 years of age in the household.
Country of origin Dummy for immigrant source country. Population register, DST. 
Year of immigration Dummy for first year of receipt of Population register, DST. 
residence permit.
No degree Dummy for 0-9 years of education  Surveybased register on immigrants' edu-
constructed from an education code of  cation level attained prior to immigration
highest degree attained. and integrated pupil register, DST.
High school degree Dummy for 10-12 years of education  Surveybased register on immigrants' edu-
constructed from an education code of  cation level attained prior to immigration
highest degree attained. and integrated pupil register, DST.
Professional degree Dummy for 13 or more years of education  Surveybased register on immigrants' edu-
constructed from an education code of  cation level attained prior to immigration
highest degree attained. and integrated pupil register, DST.
Unknown education Dummy for lack of information on  Surveybased register on immigrants' edu-
highest degree attained. cation level attained prior to immigration
and integrated pupil register, DST.
Ethnic stock Number of immigrants and descendants  Population register, DST. 
from individual i's source country k in  Author's calculations based on the
Denmark. 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
Municipality characteristics:
Number of inhabitants Number of inhabitants in municipality j. Population statistics
(population counted data), DST. 
Large Municipality with at least 100,000 Population statistics
inhabitants. (population counted data), DST. 
Medium Municipality with 10,000-99,999  Population statistics
inhabitants.  (population counted data), DST. 
Small Municipality with less than 10,000 Population statistics
inhabitants. (population counted data), DST. Table A.I
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. Part B.
Variable Definition Primary source of data
Municipality characteristics:
% immigrants Number of immigrants and descendants Population register, DST. 
living in municipalityj in per cent of the Author's calculations based on the
total number of immigrants and descen- 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
dants in Denmark.
% co-nationals Number of immigrants and descendants  Population register, DST. 
from individual i's source country k living Author's calculations based on the 100 
in municipality j in per cent of the total per cent sample of immigrants.
number of immigrants and descendants
from source country k in Denmark.
Number of immigrants Number of immigrants and descendants Population register, DST. 
of immigrants residing in municipalityj.  Author's calculations based on the 100
per cent sample of immigrants.
Ethnic group size Number of immigrants and descendants  Population register, DST. 
of immigrants from source country k Author's calculations based on the 100
residing in municipality j. per cent sample of immigrants.
Local unemployment rate The unemployment rate in a radius  Unemployment register (population 
of DKK 60 (approx. USD 10) of transport counted data), DST, and cost of transport
around the largest post office in statistics, the Ministry of Transport.
municipality j. Constructed by Local Government Studies.
% right-wing votes Sum of votes for the Liberal Party and Election statistics, DST. 
the Conservative People's Party in per cent
of the sum of votes for the Liberal Party,
the Conservative People's Party, the
Social Democratic Party and the Socialist
People's Party at the latest municipal
election. The two former parties are
traditional right-wing parties whereas the
latter two are traditional left-wing parties.
Number of educ. institutions Number of institutions for vocational  Integrated pupil register 
and higher education in municipality j. (population counted data), DST.
% county jobs Number of individuals employed in muni- Registerbased labour force statistics
cipality j in per cent of the total number (population counted data), DST.
of individuals employed in the county.
% social housing Number of social housing dwellings Buildings and housing statistics
for all-year residence in per cent of the (population counted data), DST.
total number of dwellings
for all-year residence in municipality j. 
Number of placed  Number of immigrants from individual i's  Population register, DST. 
co-nationals in year t source country placed by the authorities  Author's calculations based on the 100
in individual i's municipality of assignment per cent sample of immigrants.
in year t, t=-7, -6, …, 0, where 0 refers to
the year of immigration of individual i.Table A.II
Summary statistics (initial values). Means (std. dev.). Part A.




Young children .24 .43













Immigration year 1986 .26 .44
Immigration year 1987 .13 .34
Immigration year 1988 .10 .30
Immigration year 1989 .12 .32
Immigration year 1990 .09 .28
Immigration year 1991 .10 .30
Immigration year 1992 .11 .32
Immigration year 1993 .09 .28
ln(ethnic stock) 3,710.78 1964.92
45Table A.II
Summary statistics (initial values). Means (std. dev.). Part B.
Variables Mean Std. dev.
Basic schooling .06 .23
High school degree .25 .43
Professional degree .13 .34
Missing information on educational attainment .56 .50
Municipality of residence:
Number of inhabitants 111,669 136,851
% immigrants 3.61 6.45




Number of immigrants 8,759 15,784
Ethnic group size 265 399
Unemployment rate 10.21 2.40
% right-wing votes 40.21 12.16
Number of educ. institutions 9.14 10.03
% county jobs 26.00 25.56
% social housing 20.35 9.96
Number of placed co-nationals in year t 23.0 22.1
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-1 13.8 19.4
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-2 9.7 16.7
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-3 7.6 15.5
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-4 5.5 13.7
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-5 4.2 12.8
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-6 3.0 11.0
Number of placed co-nationals in year t-7 1.4 6.9
Number of observations 13,927
46Table A.III
Ethnic stock by ethnic group and calendar year.
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Ethnic group
Poland 6,953 7,748 8,244 8,847 9,451 9,926 10,400 10,819 11,111 11,392
Iraq 274 792 1,170 1,439 1,914 2,474 2,929 3,477 4,634 5,677
Iran 998 4,926 6,175 7,155 8,187 8,856 9,515 10,342 10,780 11,172
Vietnam 3,797 4,017 4,331 4,625 5,144 5,867 6,642 7,425 8,316 8,838
Sri Lanka 356 776 3,102 4,308 4,601 5,129 5,417 5,789 6,253 6,735
Lebanon 391 879 3,321 5,302 6,608 8,570 10,256 12,128 13,881 15,002
Ethiopia 242 330 438 530 557 625 668 710 749 806
Afghanistan 101 150 212 245 288 345 440 623 783 969
Somalia 176 189 213 249 329 539 765 1,411 2,276 3,858
Rumania 294 346 383 434 472 798 1,042 1,209 1,328 1,427
Chile 1,136 1,131 1,129 1,159 1,151 1,171 1,203 1,215 1,221 1,218
Notes: Refugees from Lebanon are Palestinian refugees with no citizenship. Data source:
Longitudinal administrative registers from Statistics Denmark on the immigrant population in
Denmark 1984-2000.
Table A.IV
Summary statistics for the dependent variables by ethnic group.
Self-employment rate Wage-employment rate
Ethnic group: Men Women Men Women
Poland 0.07 (0.26) 0.04 (0.20) 0.45 (0.50) 0.37 (0.49)
Iraq 0.13 (0.34) 0.02 (0.13) 0.19 (0.39) 0.11 (0.31)
Iran 0.13 (0.34) 0.04 (0.19) 0.21 (0.41) 0.15 (0.36)
Vietnam 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.25) 0.43 (0.50) 0.18 (0.39)
Sri Lanka 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.52 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47)
Lebanon 0.10 (0.30) 0.02 (0.12) 0.14 (0.34) 0.05 (0.21)
Ethiopia 0.01 (0.10) 0 (0) 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44)
Afghanistan 0.17 (0.37) 0.06 (0.23) 0.20 (0.40) 0.10 (0.31)
Somalia 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.11) 0.27 (0.45) 0.08 (0.27)
Rumania 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.26) 0.46 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50)
Chile 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.36 (0.50) 0.50 (0.53)
All 0.09 (0.29) 0.03 (0.17) 0.26 (0.44) 0.15 (0.36)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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